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Abstract
We examine commuting in a game-theoretic setting with a contin-
uum of commuters. Commuters’ home and work locations can be het-
erogeneous. The exogenous transport network is arbitrary. Traﬃc
speed is determined by link capacity and by local congestion at a time
and place along a link, where local congestion at a time and place is
endogenous. After formulating a static model, where consumers choose
only routes to work, and a dynamic model, where they also choose de-
parture times, we describe and examine existence of Nash equilibrium
in both models and show that they diﬀer, so the static model is not a
steady state representation of the dynamic model. Then it is shown via
the folk theorem that for suﬃciently large discount factors the repeated
dynamic model has as equilibrium any strategy that is achievable in the
one shot game with choice of departure times, including the eﬃcient
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ones. A similar result holds for the static model. Our results pose a
challenge to congestion pricing. Finally, we examine evidence from St.
Louis to determine what equilibrium strategies are actually played in
the repeated commuting game.
JEL number: R41 Keywords: commuting, folk theorem
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Commuting is a ubiquitous feature of the urban economy. Although the
classic literature has answered the basic questions in the field, such as whether
equilibrium commuting patterns are eﬃcient, surprisingly some very important
questions remain open. Do models without an explicit (continuous) time clock
give us an accurate picture of traﬃc, in the sense that they can approximate
behavior in a truly dynamic model? What happens to commuting when
the situation is repeated daily? Does behavior diﬀer dramatically from that
observed in the simple context where the commuters know that they only have
to commute once? One shot commuting is the exclusive focus of the extant
literature.
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Figure 1: Evening rush hour (5-6 PM) I-64 westbound weekdays .3 miles
west of Hampton Avenue
Empirical motivation for our work comes from Figure 1. A major commuting
highway in St. Louis was shut down on January 2, 2008. Why did rush
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hour traﬃc speed on the highway decrease during the last three months before
closure relative to previous dates? We shall return to this in section 3.2 below.
But first, we discuss the basic literature on commuting.
Beckmann et al. (1956) provide a model of rush hour where flows are
constant. They analyze optimum and equilibrium in a stylized model with
no explicit time clock, but with a representative commuter. Vickery (1963,
1969) provided the classical analysis of congestion externalities, pricing, and
infrastructure investment. Arnott et al. (1993) examine primarily welfare
under various pricing schemes when there is only one route or bottleneck, but
allow elastic trip demand and use continuous time. Traﬃc does not slow down
due to congestion, but rather queues at the bottleneck. In their conclusions (p.
177), they note: “In the context of rush hour traﬃc congestion, for example,
models should be developed which derive hypercongestion (traﬃc-jam situa-
tions) from driving behavior, solve for equilibrium on a congested network,
and account for heterogeneity among users...” This is what we attempt.
The game-theoretic literature on externalities, for example Sandholm (2001),
has the potential to be useful in our context. However, the strong symmetry
assumptions used, that yield strong and interesting conclusions, exclude al-
most all of the games of interest to us. For example, they exclude the simple
special case of our model where there are two nodes called home and work with
one link between them, but two departure times. Hu (2010) considers Nash
equilibrium with continuous departures for a single commuting corridor for one
morning rush hour. It is shown that with a specific dynamic, the equilibrium
exists and is unique. As we shall illustrate in the next subsection, multiple
equilibria are quite natural in models of commuting. Ross and Yinger (2000)
show that the only equilibrium in a general urban equilibrium version of a
commuting model with continuous departure times and flow congestion but
no bottlenecks is an unreasonable one with a never ending rush hour. As we
shall explain below, by allowing a large but finite number of departure times
and randomizing departures over small intervals between these discrete depar-
ture times, with some eﬀort we can overcome these diﬃculties. Konishi (2004)
considers existence, uniqueness and eﬃciency of Nash equilibrium primarily in
a static model but also in a dynamic model with queues, employing Schmei-
dler’s (1973) theorem1 as we do. He uses bottlenecks whereas we use speed
reductions resulting from congestion. Konishi’s work is quite complementary
1To apply Schmeidler’s work to obtain Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, it is important
that the set of pure strategies be finite. In our model, the interpretation is that the set of
departure time strategies is finite.
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to ours, as we are not as concerned with the issues he considers, but rather
with comparison of equilibria in the static and dynamic models as well as the
equilibria of the repeated game.
The transportation engineering literature, for example Daganzo (2008),
typically takes the behavior of individuals, namely their choice of routes and
departure times, as exogenous. Thus, Nash equilibrium is not studied.2 Once
we have enough notation, we will be specific about how our model compares
with its closest relative in that literature.
In summary, the main diﬀerence between our work and most of the literature
is that we address diﬀerent questions. That is, our primary purposes are: 1)
To compare the Nash equilibria of the one shot commuting games without
a time clock to the Nash equilibria of commuting games with a time clock,
and 2) To study the equilibria of the commuting game repeated daily. But
before considering these issues, first we must prove the basic results involving
equilibrium and optimum for our model. A less important diﬀerence with
much of the literature is that we do not use bottlenecks or queues, instead
requiring that traﬃc slow down as a function of endogenous congestion.
Although the notation used to describe the models formally is burdensome,
we will give examples and intuition for the results in addition to the techni-
calities. We formulate both a static model, where time plays no role, and
a dynamic model, where it does play a role. The dynamic model features a
uniform time by which commuters must arrive at work if they don’t want to be
subjected to a penalty. We assume that commuters have an inelastic demand
for one trip per day to work.
Our results and the outline of the balance of the paper are as follows.
In the next subsection of the introduction, we detail and preview our results
with minimal notation by using the simplest example, a network with two
nodes and one link where all commuters live at one node and commute to
their jobs at the other. In Section 2, we give our notation and specify the
general static (timeless) and dynamic models. At this point, we also prove
our basic results for each model: that Nash equilibria in pure strategies exist,
that Pareto optima exist, and that these two sets generally diﬀer. Next,
we examine whether the static model can be viewed as a reduced form of
the dynamic model, where time is explicit. The answer is an emphatic NO.
In Section 3, we study Nash equilibria of each of the models when they are
2For example, the first appearance of a utility function in Daganzo (2008) is at the bottom
of p. 315. The body of the book ends at the top of p. 319.
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repeated daily. By applying the folk theorem, we find that the set of equilibria
is much larger than in the one shot game, be it static or dynamic. It is of the
utmost importance that researchers consider this expansion of the equilibrium
set when analyzing their models. The repeated game structure yields many
more equilibria, even when the folk theorem does not apply, than the one shot
game structure studied in the literature. Evidence relevant to repeated game
strategies used by commuters in St. Louis is examined. Finally, Section 4
gives our conclusions.
1.2 Example
We begin with a simple example to illustrate how the model works and the
intuition behind our results. Consider commuters uniformly distributed on
the interval [0 1] with nodes 1 and 2. Each commuter commutes from node
1 to node 2 each day. For simplicity, we only consider the morning rush
hour. Denote the capacity of the link by  ∈ R+. Suppose that the time
it takes to travel the link at the speed limit is (1 2) = 1. In the static
model, the travel time is given by 1 if the average number of travellers does
not exceed capacity of the road, and by 1 otherwise. This means that if road
link capacity is exceeded, then traﬃc slows down in proportion to the ratio of
excess commuters to capacity, max(1 1). For example, if  = 12, then the
travel time for a commuter on the link is 2. There really are no choices here
for the commuters or a social planner optimizing eﬃciency, since the route is
fixed and the model is static; there are no departure times to be chosen.
Now consider a dynamic version of the model. Route choice is still fixed,
but departure (and consequent arrival) times are a choice variable of the com-
muters. We model departure times in R+, and we call the required arrival
time at the destination node 2 (say 9 AM)  ∈ R+. There is no penalty for
arriving at work early, but the penalty for arriving at work late is ∞. This
is mainly for illustration. We shall consider more general penalties for both
early and late arrival in the remaining sections. They add some complications.
Again, in this simple model there is no route choice. But there is a choice
of departure time. First, we illustrate how, for any choice of departure times
by all commuters, the time to the destination node 2 can be computed. It is
assumed that the latter is minimized by each individual commuter at a Nash
equilibrium (given the choices of others), and the social planner maximizes
a utilitarian welfare function that is minus the integral of commuting times
subject to the arrival constraint.
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The speed of a particular cohort of commuters who depart at the same
time is computed as follows. Take the local density of commuters on the road
at a particular place on the route and at a particular time. This local density
at a given place and time is computed as the limit of neighborhoods on the
road of total (measure of) commuters in the neighborhood divided by the one
dimensional size of that neighborhood. The limit is taken as the length of the
neighborhood goes to zero. The result will be the density of commuters (with
respect to distance) at that place and time. Then, as in the static model,
traﬃc slows down in proportion to the ratio of excess commuter density to
capacity.
An example will help illustrate. Consider the commuters indexed by [0 1].
Suppose that all the commuters at 0 depart at time 0, all the commuters at 1
depart at time 1, and so forth. Set the arrival time  = 2. We compute traﬃc
speeds (in this case, the arrival time does not bind). With these departure
times, when road capacity is high so that  ≥ 1, then capacity does not bind.
The unit interval of commuters moves from origin to destination at full speed
and perfect synchrony, and the local density of traﬃc is always 1 except for
commuters with labels 0 and 1. The density around them is 1
2
since there
is nobody on one side of them (for example the commuters with label 0 have
nobody in front of them). But this does not alter their speed, since they
are already at the speed limit. In theory, at least, commuters can catch up
with those ahead of them (if the ones behind are travelling faster) and slow
themselves down.
What if   1? We consider two simple patterns. First, suppose that
commuters depart exactly as in the preceding paragraph. Set the arrival time
 = 1 + 1. Traﬃc slows down by a factor of 1 relative to the no congestion
case; thus, traﬃc speed for the commuters is uniform at . It takes 1 time to
traverse the link, so the last commuters (labelled 1) reach the destination at
1
 + 1. The local density of commuters is 1 during the commute. Call this
the congested commuting pattern.
Now consider the same general departure pattern as in the preceding para-
graph, but with commuters labelled 0 beginning travel at time 0, whereas
commuters labelled 1 begin their trip at time 1 . So the density of commuters
departing at any time is . Set the arrival time  = 1+1. Since local density
is the same as capacity, all commuters travel at the speed limit. Thus, travel
time for all commuters is 1. Call this the uncongested commuting pattern.
These two simple commuting patterns, or strategy profiles, serve to illus-
6
trate the computation of local density and speed. Of course, the local density
and speed calculations can be much more complicated in, for example, more
complicated commuting networks or for more complicated departure patterns.
The simple patterns also serve to illustrate the important role played by ar-
rival time. It is rather evident that for the fixed arrival time as specified
at  = 1 + 1, these strategy profiles are Nash equilibria. Notice that all
commuters reach work by the arrival time  for either pattern, but travel
time is longer for the congested commuting pattern. Thus, welfare can diﬀer
across dynamic commuting patterns even for this simple example. It is evi-
dent that the uncongested commuting pattern Pareto dominates the congested
commuting pattern.
Consider next the comparison of the static with the dynamic model. The
first pattern, the congested commuting pattern, we study for the case   1
seems to be the analog of the static case, since traﬃc speed is constricted. But
the second pattern does not seem to have an analog. Thus, the static and
dynamic models have diﬀerent Nash equilibrium predictions. Moreover, if the
dynamic analog of the static equilibrium is the congested commuting pattern,
it is Pareto dominated by another pattern present in the dynamic model but
disallowed by the static model.
But we can say more. For example, even in the case where the equilibria of
the static and dynamic models appear to be the same, if we average congestion
for the dynamic model over time and distances on the link, many times and
distances have zero commuters and zero congestion. For instance, this happens
at distances along the link in our example that the first commuters have not
yet reached. So aggregating the equilibrium of the dynamic model this way
will not generate the static model equilibrium, since the flows in the dynamic
model will appear diluted.
An alternative criterion for comparing the static and dynamic model equi-
libria is to ask that there be at least one time and a distance along each link
such that the equilibrium flows of the models are the same. An example rel-
evant to this idea is to use three identical links in series, so that at any given
time in equilibrium commuters in the dynamic model are on at most two of the
links, unless the links are operating below capacity. Then there is no time at
which the flows on all three links are non-zero simultaneously. In section 2.3
below, we describe how to extend this example so that there is no equilibrium
of the dynamic model even remotely resembling the equilibrium of the static
model.
7
We return now, and for the remainder of the introduction, to our basic
example with 2 nodes and only 1 link. Consider the repeated commuting game
for this example. That is, the dynamic commuting game that we have specified
is played daily. What payoﬀs are attainable? We shall apply a folk theorem
below, so the set of payoﬀs attainable as Nash equilibria in the repeated game
is related to the payoﬀs attainable in the one shot game. Specifically, for large
enough discount factors in the repeated game, all feasible payoﬀs at least as
high as the maximin payoﬀ for the one shot game (that are not necessarily
Nash equilibria of the one shot game) are attainable as Nash equilibria of the
repeated game. In fact, we can show that any payoﬀ that is feasible in the one
shot game can be attained as a Nash equilibrium of the repeated game. This
result is achieved by simply computing the maximin payoﬀ of the one shot
game. It will be −∞. Why? Consider one individual in our simple example.
The worst case scenario for that individual in the one shot commuting game is
that everyone else who lives at the same node “blockades” them at time zero.
That is, the strategy used by everyone else is to depart at time 0. Then local
congestion is infinite, so nobody ever reaches the destination or even moves
at all, independent of what the commuter in question does (namely, what
departure time strategy they follow).3
With the model specified as we have outlined, a Nash equilibrium in pure
strategies or an optimum might not exist. So in what follows, for the dy-
namic model, we must simplify the problem. This is accomplished by using a
fixed, finite set of possible departure times that divide equally the time scale
in the model. When commuters choose a departure time, they are distributed
uniformly over the interval with midpoint their chosen departure time, and
length equal to the distance between allowable departure times. With this
structure, a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies and an optimum exist. More-
over, the congested and uncongested commuting patterns we have specified
are Nash equilibria of the model, and the uncongested commuting pattern is
Pareto optimal.
What follows below just makes the ideas behind our simple example formal
and general.
3There is an important issue regarding observability or detection of strategies in a model
with a continuum of commuters or players. This is addressed explicitly in section 3.2 below.
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2 The Commuting Model
Readers who wish to understand the content of the work through examples only
can focus on Examples 1-3 below and then skip to section 3.
2.1 The Static Model: Equilibrium and Optimum
Here we lay out the details of a game with an atomless measure space (con-
tinuum) of players; a finite set of nodes at which the players live, or to which
they commute, or through which they commute; and a finite set of transport
links between the nodes with exogenous capacity.
To begin, the measure space of commuters is given by ( C ) where  is
the set of commuters, C is a -algebra on , and  is a positive, non-atomic
measure.4 We assume that singletons of the form {} for  ∈  are in C; that
for all  ∈ , ({}) = 0; and 0  () ∞.
The origins and destinations in the commuting network are given by a
finite set of nodes, denoted by  = 1 2  . Let N = {1 2  }. The
commuting network itself is given by a finite set of links between nodes. The
capacity of any direct link (with no intermediate nodes) between nodes  and
 is given by  ∈ [0∞], whereas  =∞. If a direct link between nodes
 and  does not exist, then  = 0.
What remains is to specify the strategies and payoﬀs of the commuters. In
the static game, there is no choice of time of departure or arrival. There is only
route choice. To keep the model simple, we shall examine only the morning,
not the evening, commute. We assume that each commuter has a fixed origin
node and a fixed destination node, with inelastic demand for exactly one trip
between the origin and destination. Thus, there is an exogenous, measurable
origin map  :  → N and an exogenous, measurable destination map  :
 → N .
A route for commuter , denoted , is a vector of length  no less than 1 but
no more than  , with () as its first coordinate and() as its last. In other
words,  is an element of ()× [{∅}∪N ∪N 2 ∪ · · ·∪N−2]×(). Let 
be the map that projects a vector onto its coordinate . A commuting length
map is a measurable map  :  → {2 3  }. A commuting route structure
is a pair ( ) where  is a commuting length map and  is a measurable
map  :  → N () such that almost surely for  ∈ , 1(()) = () and
4Skorokhod’s theorem implies that we could without loss of generality restrict attention
to the unit interval with Lebesgue measure.
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()(()) = ().
Given a commuting route structure ( ), its flow  ∈ R2+ is given by
() = ({ ∈  | ∃ ∈ {1 2  () − 1} with (()) =  and
+1(()) = }) for  = 1 2  . We assume that if a link is oper-
ating below capacity, the time cost of a commuter on that link is constant, call
it () for  = 1 2  . However, if the link is operating above capac-
ity, then the travel time increases in proportion to the excess of commuters
above capacity, ()() · ().5 For example, if the number of commuters is
twice the capacity of a link, then the travel time is doubled. We ask that the
reader bear this special case in mind, since we use it in all of our examples to
give concrete intuition.
More generally, we can allow traﬃc to slow down according to any well-
behaved function of the number of commuters at a distance on a link and link
capacity. But for simplicity, we specify the function  : R+ → R+ where

³()
()
´
yields the rate at which traﬃc slows in response to congestion. We
assume that  is strictly increasing and continuous. For our special case,

³()
()
´
≡ ()() .
The time cost of a commuting structure ( ) for commuter  is
(  ) =
()−1X
=1
max(1 
µ((()) +1(()))
((()) +1(()))
¶
)·((()) +1(()))
Thus, − is the objective or payoﬀ function for each commuter. The utilitarian
welfare function for the static model is
( ) = −
Z

(  )()
A Nash equilibrium of the static model is a commuting structure ( ) such
that almost surely for  ∈ , there is no route  of length  for commuter 
such that
(  ) 
−1X
=1
max(1 
µ(() +1())
(() +1())
¶
) · (() +1())
5There is an issue of normalization here, namely whether  is divided by  or not. In
essence, it depends on whether a link that is twice as long is half as congested for the same
number of commuters on the link. This depends on the interpretation of the static model,
whether congestion is viewed as a pulse of commuters or whether they are uniformly spread
out over the link. In this paper, we take the view that in the model without time, twice as
many commuters on a link results in twice the congestion, no matter the length of the link.
However, if one takes the view that length of the link matters, the result is simply division
of our  by , and this makes no essential diﬀerence in the the results we obtain. As we
show in section 3, interpretation of the static model is diﬃcult.
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Existence of Nash equilibrium in pure strategies can be proved by applying
Schmeidler (1973, Theorems 1 and 2). Rosenthal (1973) proves that a Nash
equilibrium in pure strategies exists even when there is a finite number of
commuters.
Next we prove (informally) that an optimum exists. The problem can
easily be reduced to optimization of the utilitarian welfare function over a
compact set as follows. Notice first that there is a finite number of types of
commuters, defined by their origin-destination pairs. Instead of using route
choice for each commuter, employ as control variables the measure of each
type following each route. Thus, the social planner controls a finite number
of variables in a compact set using a continuous objective, so a maximum is
attained.
Example 1: We note that due to the congestion externality, the Nash equi-
libria are unlikely to be Pareto (or utilitarian) optimal. To see this informally,
consider an example with 3 nodes. All commuters travel between nodes 1 and
3. There is a direct route, and an alternate route that runs via node 2. The
alternative route takes longer than the direct route for each fixed number of
commuters below capacity because it requires a longer distance of travel. For
example, each road has capacity 1 and takes 1 unit of time to cross, so the
longer route uses 2 units of time when running below capacity, whereas the
shorter route takes 1 unit of time when running below capacity. Suppose
that there is measure 5
2
of commuters. A Nash equilibrium of this model has
the direct route running above capacity, with measure 2 commuters using it
for a total travel time of 2, and the indirect route running below capacity (5
measure, with a total travel time of 2) such that the travel time to work for
each commuter is the same. To create a Pareto improvement over the Nash
equilibrium, simply move some commuters (say measure 5) from the direct
to the indirect route. The travel time on the indirect route (namely 2) is
the same as at the Nash equilibrium, even for the commuters switched to that
route, whereas the travel time for those on the direct route decreases (to 15).
2.2 The Dynamic Model: Equilibrium and Optimum
The basics of the dynamic model are the same as those for the static model.
To diﬀerentiate the notation, we will add “dynamic” to the names and add
time  as an argument of functions. In the dynamic model, each commuter
chooses both a departure time (from their origin node) and a route. Routes
were discussed in the previous subsection. We allow a commuter to depart at
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any time  ∈ [0  ]. As we shall see shortly, it is important that this set be
bounded. From the list of everyone’s strategies, each commuter can compute
with certainty when they will arrive at their destination node.
A dynamic commuting route structure is a triple (  ) where  :  →
[0  ] is a measurable function giving departure times for all commuters,  is a
commuting length map and  is a measurable map  :  → N () such that
almost surely for  ∈ , 1(()) = () and ()(()) = ().
At this juncture, there is an issue concerning the detail in which we model
congestion on each link in the dynamic model. The simplest way to model
this is to look only at average congestion on a link. More complicated is to
assume that as traﬃc ebbs and flows, the congestion at the end of the link
determines traﬃc speed on the entire link. The most detailed model, that we
use, allows cars to catch up with each other over the course of a link. We
use the most detailed model, but assuming link capacity is constant across the
link. This is without loss of generality, provided that capacity changes only
a finite number of times on a link. In that case, we just add more nodes and
links with diﬀerent capacities.
We shall define commuter progress from origin to destination through a
diﬀerential equation in distance. But first we must define progress on each
component of a route in a dynamic route structure. First, fix a dynamic route
structure (  ). The basic idea is this. From departure time to the end
of the first link, we follow the diﬀerential equation for congestion for the first
link, and then begin on the second link, and so forth. Notice that the total
distance on a link is given by the distance travelled with no congestion in the
minimal time: Z ()
0
1 = ()
This is the length of the link between nodes and . For notational simplicity,
for  = 1  (), define  () to be the time that node (()) is reached.
Evidently,  1() = ().
Given a dynamic commuting route structure (  ), we shall associate
with it a function (() ) that gives as its value the distance travelled
on link  by commuter  at time  who begins travel on link  at time
(). This function is increasing in its second argument but decreasing in
its first argument. Does such a function exist, and is it unique? Take such a
12
function . Compute inductively
 +1() =
X
=1
 ()+min{ 0  0 | (())+1(())( ()  0) = ((()) +1(())}
(1)
We can then compute its flow at time  on link  at distance ∆, calledb : N 2 ×R2+ → R+. It is given by6
b(  ∆) = lim→0 ({ ∈  | (() ) ∈ (∆− ∆+ )})2 (2)
Then compute
˙(() ) = min( 1
³ ((()))
()
´  1) (3)
This describes the progress made by commuters on each link of the entire
dynamic commuting route structure for any time  .
Unfortunately, as mentioned in Section 1.2 above, the system defining ,
namely (1), (2), and (3), is technically challenging. The reason is that we
cannot restrict , the function defining the departure strategies of players,
beyond assuming that it is a measurable function. Each individual makes a
choice, and this is not necessarily coordinated. Discontinuities in departure
flows or densities can result in discontinuities in ˙ that rule out our ability
to use standard techniques from the theory of ordinary diﬀerential equations
as well as the contraction mapping theorem. Beyond this issue regarding
departure times, there is another factor that comes into play. As we will
discuss in detail shortly, if cars can catch up with others on a link (as opposed
to at a node), they can slow themselves down by forming an atom; this in
itself can cause discontinuities in ˙, as it can jump suddenly from a positive
number to zero.7
6The function b is nothing more than the derivative of the measure induced by . For
more detail, see Rudin (1974, chapter 8), in particular Theorem 8.6.
7With this preparation, we can discuss the transportation engineering literature. Nat-
urally, it is concerned more with practical traﬃc issues than with the questions we pose.
The closest relative to our model in this literature is the cell transmission version of the
Lighthill-Whitman-Richards (LWR) model; see Daganzo (2008) section 4.4.6. There are
some important diﬀerences. First, the LWR model takes departures as exogenous and
smooth, whereas we do not. Second, like most models of traﬃc, the LWR model employs
queues or bottlenecks when there is congestion. In contrast, we assume that traﬃc slows
as a function of traﬃc density. These two important diﬀerences express themselves as
diﬀerences in the equilibrium behavior of the models.
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Even if we can retrieve a well-defined  for each  function, the issue
then becomes the fact that there might not exist a Nash equilibrium in pure
strategies, since the space of pure strategies is a continuum. Schmeidler (1973)
relies heavily on the fact that the number of pure strategies available to players
is finite.
We solve both of the problems at once by simplifying the dynamic model.
Fix  small where  is an even integer, and define the departure strategy
space to be {  3   ( − 1)}. This makes the strategy space finite.
We assume that all the commuters who choose say  will be randomly and
uniformly distributed on (0 2), those who choose the strategy 3 will be
randomly and uniformly distributed on (2  4), and so forth. The examples
in the introduction and that follow fit this framework because they use a
uniform distribution of departure times.
Theorem 1: The system of equations (1), (2), and (3) with initial condition
(  ) = 0 for all  = 1   and  ∈ R+ has a unique solution.
Proof: We find the functions  and  () explicitly. Fix a dynamic
commuting route structure (  ). Let b(  0) = () +  0 where  0 is a
random variable uniformly distributed on (−  ) denote the actual departure
time of commuter , that diﬀers from the chosen departure time () by
at most  as described just above. To reduce the notational burden, we
shall generally suppress the second argument ( 0) in any function b . Thenb 1() = b(). In general, given b , we will define inductively b +1. Fix any
origin node  and destination node  6= . On each segment , defining
() = {0 ∈  | (0) = (); for some  ≤ (),
1(()) = 1((0)),, −1(()) = −1((0));
−1(()) = −1((0)) = , (()) = ((0)) = }
the default speed for commuter  is given by
() = min( 1
³(())2
()
´  1)
The default speed might be counterfactual, but it is a useful construct. At
the default speed, intervals of commuters never overlap with each other. When
this happens, the time on this link is exactly ()(), so b +1() =b ()+()() whereas (b () ) = ()·[−b ()]where (()) =
. But there are two other possibilities beyond this first case. The second
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case is when commuters using diﬀerent routes blend with each other or sep-
arate beginning at a node; this is actually a generalization of the concept of
default speed. The third case is if a segment of commuters catches up with
another along a link. We consider each of these in turn.
The second case that is possible in the model is when commuters using
diﬀerent routes blend or separate at a node. For the case where they separate,
if they are not combined with commuters using other routes, they move at the
default speed on the link. But this is just to give intuition. Formally, defining
0( ) = {0 ∈  | 0(b −1(0)b ()) ∈ ((0)−  (0));
(()) = , +1(()) = ; ((0)) = , +1((0)) =  and −1((0)) = 0 }
the speed of commuters is given by
∗() = min( 1

µ
0 6= lim→0
(0())
()
¶  1)
Provided that they don’t catch up with anyone else, their time on the link is ex-
actly ()∗(), so b +1() = b ()+()∗()whereas (b () ) =
() · [ − b ()] where (()) = . This is actually the most general
form of the speed and time functions. Notice that since the number of types
is finite, the denominator of the right hand side of the last equation actually
is almost surely constant for  suﬃciently small.
On each segment , we say that commuter  catches up with commuter
0 on link  if
(()) = ((0)) = , +1(()) = +1((0)) = b (0)  b ()
()
∗()− ∗(0)  b ()− b (0)
If a set of commuters of positive measure ever catches up with another on a
link, an atom accumulates quickly at the upper end of the faster commuter’s
interval (and at the bottom end of the slower commuter’s interval). The slower
commuter, who is unaﬀected, continues on at the same speed as before the
faster one catches them. The faster commuter literally comes to a stop at that
point in the segment, and no commuter who follows on this segment makes any
further progress. For any commuter who arrives at this spot afterward on this
link, time on this link is infinite. If commuter  catches up with commuter 0 on
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link, define the catch up8 time, for (()) = ((0)) = , +1(()) =
+1((0)) = , as  ∗ = b () + ∗(0)·[()− (0)]∗()−∗(0) . Thus, for all 00 ∈  with((00)) = , +1((00)) = , b(00) ≥  ∗, then b+1(00) = ∞ whereas
(b(00) ) = (b ()  ∗) for all  ≥ b(00) + ( ()∗)∗(00) is constant for
anyone who reaches this spot after the time where the atom forms.
Now that all three cases have been discussed, we can complete the argu-
ment. It is essentially a finite but computational argument. Run the entire
system, assuming the counterfactual that it always runs at the default speed.
This yields a counterfactual solution. Find the first time for which either the
second or third case occurs. Now run the entire system again, assuming the
default speed except for the deviation caused at this first time. Continue this
procedure until all deviations are accounted for. Given the finite nature of
the system, this involves only a finite number of times where discrete changes
in the system occur. Thus, the algorithm terminates.
The time cost of a dynamic commuting structure (  ) for commuter 
is
R 
− [b ()( )−(()+)]· 12 ·({0∈|1(())=1((0)), 2(())=2((0)), ()=(0)}) .
In essence, this is the expected time cost taken over all commuters using the
same pure departure (time and first road) strategy.
We fix an arrival time at  ∈ [0∞]. Next we introduce the arrival
penalty function  : R+ → R+. To give intuition, think of  =  ()(). The
arrival penalty is given by
 () ≥ 0 where  () = 0
For example, in the introduction we required that:
Almost surely for  ∈ , b ()() ≤ 
Thus,  () = 0 for  ≤  whereas  () = ∞ for   . It is actually
more common in the literature to use an asymmetric linear penalty function;
see Arnott et al (1993). We can allow further generalization, for example
heterogeneous arrival times , but at the cost of messier notation. We note
that in the framework with a finite number of departure times, this is actually
the expected penalty for the given choice of strategy, since commuters are
randomly assigned over a small interval.
8Also known as catsup.
16
The individual payoﬀ function for the dynamic model is thus:
−
Z 
−
[b ()(  0)− (() +  0) +  (b ()(  0))]
· 1
2 · ({0 ∈  | 1(()) = 1((0)), 2(()) = 2((0)), () = (0)})
0
The utilitarian welfare function for the dynamic model is
((·)  ) =
−
Z

Z 
−
[b ()(  0)− (() +  0) +  (b ()(  0))]
· 1
2 · ({0 ∈  | 1(()) = 1((0)), 2(()) = 2((0)), () = (0)})
0()
ANash equilibrium of the dynamic model is a dynamic commuting structure
(  ) such that almost surely for  ∈ , there is no route  of length  and
departure time 0 for commuter  such that, computing arrival times b 0 as in
Theorem 1 for the new route and departure time,Z 
−
[b ()(  0)− (() +  0) +  (b ()(  0))]
· 1
2 · ({0 ∈  | 1(()) = 1((0)), 2(()) = 2((0)), () = (0)})
0 Z 
−
[b 0(  0)− (0 +  0) +  (b 0(  0))]
· 1
2 · ({0 ∈  | 1(()) = 1((0)), 2(()) = 2((0)), () = (0)})
0
We note that due to the congestion externality, the Nash equilibria are
unlikely to be Pareto (or utilitarian) optimal. Example 2 below will make this
precise.
At this point, there is an important but technical issue that must be ad-
dressed. One of the requirements of Schmeidler’s results is that utility is
continuous (in the weak topology on 1) in the strategy profile of all com-
muters. For the model we have stated, this is in fact not true. In all of these
models, there is an important discontinuity that must be addressed. A simple
version of it can be seen in the example with two nodes and one link. Assume
that the payoﬀ from never arriving is very low. Suppose that a large, slow
cohort (exceeding the road capacity) leaves early. Then suppose a small, fast
moving cohort leaves soon after, so that the second cohort catches up with the
first along the link. When the second cohort catches the first, it forms an
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atom at that point along the link and comes to a stop. This will hold as long
as the second cohort has positive measure. But as we reduce the measure of
this second cohort down to zero, it has a very low payoﬀ until the limit, where
the cohort has zero measure, and catching up with the first cohort does not
result in a penalty. In fact the payoﬀ for this zero measure second cohort
is larger than for the first cohort, since the second cohort can leave later but
arrive at the same time as the first cohort.
We fix this discontinuity in the obvious way as follows. Any strategy profile
that has all strategies used by a positive measure of commuters has its utility
for each commuter unchanged. For any strategy profile that has a strategy or
strategies used by only a set of measure zero, for each of these strategies we
add a set of measure  from outside the model using these strategies (leaving
the strategies of the commuters in the model unchanged) and define the utility
of the limiting strategy to be the limit of the payoﬀs as  → 0. With this
modification, payoﬀ functions are continuous.
Existence of Nash equilibrium in pure strategies can be proved for the
version of the model with discrete and finite departure times by ap-
plying Schmeidler (1973, Theorems 1 and 2). For the model with a continuum
of departure time strategies, we can only obtain existence of -equilibrium in
pure strategies.
Similar to the proof for the static model, it is easy to prove that an optimum
exists for the discrete departure time model. Instead of looking at a continuum
of individual strategies, give the social planner the control variables that are
the measure of commuters using each route at each departure time. Given the
structure in Theorem 1, the utilitarian objective is upper semicontinuous as a
function of the measure of commuters using each route and departure time.9
Example 2: What does Nash Equilibrium look like in the case of a linear
penalty function? This is important for applications, as much of the literature
uses such a specification. It is actually quite interesting. Suppose that
 () =
(
( − ) if  ≥ 
( − ) if  ≥ 
where ,   0. To fix ideas, we consider the example from the introduction,
with one link and two nodes, modified for this penalty function. Capacity of
the link is  = 1, whereas travel time on the uncongested link is 1. At a Nash
equilibrium, utility must be equalized across commuters, for otherwise everyone
9In particular, this relies on the strict inequalities in the definition of “catching up” in
the proof of Theorem 1.
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will imitate the happiest ones only. Fortunately for urban economists, this
is a familiar condition. There is mass 2 of identical commuters. Consider
an example with 2 departure times, 1
2
and 3
2
. Those who choose departure
time 1
2
actually leave at a random time distributed uniformly between 0 and
1, whereas those who choose departure time 3
2
actually leave at a random time
distributed uniformly between 1 and 2. Let  = 7
2
and  =   1
3
. It will
turn out that in Nash equilibrium, the commuters who choose departure time
1
2
travel at the speed limit, whereas the commuters who leave at time 3
2
travel
slower and arrive later. Suppose the (endogenous) measure of commuters
who choose departure time 1
2
is called , whereas the (endogenous) measure of
commuters who leave at time 3
2
is called , where  +  = 2. Computing the
equal utility condition, for those who choose departure time 1
2
, their travel time
is 1 whereas their expected early arrival penalty is 2. For those departing
at time 1, their travel time is  whereas their expected early arrival penalty
is  · (7
2
− ( + 3
2
)). Setting these negative utilities equal to each other, we
obtain  = 1
1− . Notice that, similar to Example 1, we can create a Pareto
improvement by making more agents choose departure time 1
2
. This disrupts
the equal utility condition.
Although both Examples 1 and 2 rely on one route or one departure time
operating below capacity, this is used only for simplicity. The classical Braess
(1968) paradox provides another class of examples. That work shows that in a
static model, adding new links to a network can cause equilibrium travel time
to increase. For our purposes, the opposite experiment works. If one begins
with a network Nash equilibrium and then allows a planner to prohibit travel
on some links, a Pareto improvement can be created.
2.3 Can the Static Equilibrium be Supported by a Dy-
namic Equilibrium?10
Here we ask the following question. Given identical exogenous data for the
static and dynamic commuting games and finding equilibrium, are the flows
in the static and dynamic models the same? This is important for addressing
the issue of whether the static model makes sense. For if the answer to this
question is negative, then there should be no interest in the static model, since
its equilibrium behavior is diﬀerent from the analogous dynamic model, and
the real world is dynamic.
10The ideas in this subsection owe much to Anas (2007) and to discussions with Alex
Anas.
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For simplicity, we return now to the examples used in many of the previous
sections, namely where there is no penalty for early arrival and an infinite
penalty for late arrival. One could imagine that the static model represents
some sort of steady state of the dynamic model, where commuters are intro-
duced at constant flows at all the nodes, and the flows in the links are constant
over time. But there are two problems with this idea. First, with a fixed ar-
rival time (say 9 AM), a steady state does not make sense. The time profile of
equilibrium departures will generally not be constant over time, since everyone
must get to work by the arrival time. Even if arrival time varied by commuter,
one would not expect to see a steady state necessarily attained. Second, the
two alternative concepts for consistency of the two models we introduce next
are weaker than asking that a steady state of the dynamic model look like a
static equilibrium. In other words, if a steady state of the dynamic model
looked like the static model, then the conditions would be satisfied. But they
are not.
One could ask the question of whether average flows (over time and space
or distance on a link) in the dynamic model are equilibrium flows of the static
model. Given the identical exogenous data for the static and dynamic games
and finding equilibrium, does the following condition on flows hold?11
() =
R ()
0
R 
0
b(  ∆)∆
() ·  for all  = 1 2  
But this disguises the following issue. In the dynamic model, flows could be
high for a time and then zero. The average over the link and over time would
be in between, but there would be no actual time and distance on the link
where the average was actually attained. So it is logical to ask whether there
is a time  , and a distance on every link ∆(), such that the flows from the
static model are attained by the dynamic model:12
() = b(  ∆()) for all  = 1 2  
To answer all of these questions in the negative, one only need go back
to the simple example with two nodes and one link given in the introduction.
11In a steady state of the dynamic model, this condition would be satisfied because the
flow on each link would be constant, independent of time, and thus be equal to the average
flow.
12In a steady state of the dynamic model, this condition would be satisfied because the
flow on each link would be constant, independent of time, so it would be satisfied for every
time.
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There the uncongested commuting pattern Nash equilibrium is not present
for the static model, though the congested one is. But if we want to say
something more, for example that there is no equilibrium of the dynamic
model that replicates the behavior of the static model, then we must become
slightly more sophisticated.
Example 3: We set up a network with 3 identical links in series, each one
with the structure of the simple example in the introduction (equivalently, one
could use 2 nodes and 1 link with the travel time multiplied by 3). Then if we
set the arrival time at 1 + 3 (where   1), the congested commuting pattern
violates the arrival time for the last commuters, the commuters departing at
time 1 (they arrive at 3+1), and the uncongested commuting pattern remains
as the only equilibrium of the dynamic model. It violates all of the conditions
above, as there is no uncongested commuting pattern for the static model.
In fact, even if we only pay attention to distances on links where there are
commuters, their density is   1, never to be found in an equilibrium of the
static model. In summary, for this example, the only equilibrium of the static
model is the congested commuting pattern, whereas the only equilibrium of the
dynamic model is the uncongested commuting pattern. Thus, the equilibrium
sets of the two models are unrelated.
3 The Repeated Commuting Game
3.1 The Commuting Folk Theorem and the Commuting
Anti-Folk Theorem
It seems obvious that there are few other games better suited to the folk theo-
rem than the (repeated) commuting game, but we have not seen an application.
It is not crazy to assume that people play the same game (but not necessarily
the same strategy) every day on their commute, modulo random factors such
as weather. The folk theorem has proved to be quite robust, so random factors
could be added.
In repeated games with a continuum of players, the commuting game is a
very nice special case. There are two possible theories of equilibrium behavior,
both quite famous, namely the Folk Theorem and theAnti-Folk Theorem. The
conclusions of the two theorems are in a sense opposites. The first says that
any individually rational, feasible payoﬀs are equilibria of the repeated game.
The second says that only Nash equilibria of the one shot game are equilibria
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of the repeated game. The critical issue in the determination of which one
applies is what players observe about other players’ chosen past strategies in
finite repetitions of the game. The formalities can get technical; see Kaneko
(1982), Massó and Rosenthal (1989), and Massó (1993). So we describe them
in a relatively informal manner.
The critical question is this: After finitely many plays of the game, fixing
one particular individual, can a positive measure of players observe that indi-
vidual player’s behavior? If there is such a set of positive measure for each
fixed individual, then the folk theorem applies. If no individual’s behavior can
be detected by a set of players of positive measure, then the anti-folk theorem
applies. Note that these two cases are not exhaustive. In the end, which
theorem might apply is an empirical matter. There is some evidence that, in
other contexts, the folk theorem is relevant; see, for instance, Lee (1999).
With a finite number of strategies (departure times and routes), it is not
far-fetched to think that any particular individual’s strategy is observable by
those who use the same departure time and route.13 In the next subsection,
we give a second reason, called the “snowball eﬀect,” why defection from equi-
librium strategies might be observable.
Let’s start by assuming observability and apply the folk theorem. Here
we examine two repeated games. The first has the static model repeated
every day, namely a countable infinity of repetitions. The second has the
dynamic model repeated every day. The main results, using Kaneko (1982,
Propositions 2.1 and 2.1’), show that if commuters have discount factors suf-
ficiently close to one, in other words they do not discount the future much,
then there is a huge variety of equilibria. The usual folk theorem holds, so
any individually rational, feasible strategy (not necessarily a Nash equilibrium
in the one shot game) can be obtained as a Nash equilibrium of the repeated
game. Kaneko (1982, Proposition 2.1") proves The Perfect Folk Theorem,
where we can restrict even to subgame perfect Nash equilibrium and obtain
similar results. The equilibrium strategies are supported by various punish-
ment strategies, that apply if the prescribed equilibrium is not followed by a
player. Thus, the one day equilibrium is just one of many. Moreover, on the
equilibrium path, one only observes the prescribed equilibrium strategies, not
the punishments. Thus, one expects to see the one shot equilibrium played,
perhaps, but also (for example) the eﬃcient strategies.
13At this point, it is useful to take versions of strategies such that if a set of measure zero
plays a particular strategy, then no commuter plays it.
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In the static model, the implication is that any feasible route strategy that
gives utility at least as high as the maximin payoﬀ for the one shot game for
each commuter can be achieved as a constant (over time) Nash equilibrium
strategy for the infinitely repeated game with no discounting. If we modify
this so that the utility of the strategy in the one shot game is at least  greater
than the maximin utility, then the prescribed strategy can be achieved as a
Nash equilibrium strategy in the infinitely repeated game with a discount factor
suﬃciently close to 1. Example 1 is applicable here. In that example, there is
a Pareto improvement where utility is not the same for all commuters. Thus,
it will not be a Nash equilibrium for the one shot game, since the commuters
with lower utility will try to imitate those with higher utility. However, it can
be supported as a (subgame perfect) Nash equilibrium in the repeated game
with discount factor suﬃciently close to 1. Standard strategies that support
this are the threat of Nash reversion.
For the repeated dynamic game, assume that lim→∞  () = ∞. One
strategy producing the maximin payoﬀ, equal to −∞ for any commuter, is
to blockade the commuter at the first opportunity. If the departure grid
is suﬃciently fine relative to the measure of commuters departing from each
origin node, then other commuters can always make any particular commuter
arrive as late as desired. Thus, by choosing the grid to be suﬃciently fine, any
payoﬀ is above the maximin payoﬀ. The upshot is that any feasible departure
time and route strategy gives a payoﬀ that is at least as high as the maximin
payoﬀ. So any feasible route and departure time strategy for the one shot
game can be supported as a Nash equilibrium of the infinitely repeated game
without discounting. If we modify this so that the utility of the prescribed
strategy in the one shot game is above −∞, then the prescribed strategy can
be achieved in the infinitely repeated game with a discount factor suﬃciently
close to 1. Example 2 is applicable here. In that example, there is a Pareto
improvement where utility is not the same for all commuters. Thus, it will
not be a Nash equilibrium for the one shot game, since the commuters with
lower utility will try to imitate those with higher utility. However, it can be
supported as a (subgame perfect) Nash equilibrium in the repeated game with
discount factor suﬃciently close to 1. Standard strategies that support this
are the threat of Nash reversion.
As we have described, the Braess paradox gives further examples of Pareto
improvements over one shot Nash equilibrium that can be supported in re-
peated games.
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Of course, if no individual’s behavior is observable, then the anti-folk theo-
rem applies to both the static and dynamic models, so the only Nash equilibria
of the repeated game are the Nash equilibria of the one shot game (Kaneko,
1982, Propositions 2.3 and 2.3’).
3.2 Finite Commuters vs. Continuum of Commuters:
The Snowball Eﬀect
Here we consider the relevance of models with a continuum of commuters, such
as the one we have used. Of course, they are only relevant in the case that
they are mathematically convenient approximations to the equilibria of models
with a large but finite number of commuters.
With a finite number of commuters, the anti-folk theorem becomes irrele-
vant, as the folk theorem applies. With a continuum of commuters without
observability of strategies, the anti-folk theorem applies. Due to this apparent
discontinuity in the set of equilibria as the number of commuters tends to in-
finity, it is imperative to examine the continuity properties of the equilibrium
set.
Given the discussion of the previous subsection, we consider two cases in
the context of the commuting game: when individual strategies are observable
and when individual strategies are unobservable.
When individual strategies are observable, the commuting folk theorem
applies to both the model with a finite number of commuters and a continuum
of commuters. Thus, there is no issue of a discontinuity as the number of
commuters tends to infinity.
When individual strategies are not observable, there is the potential for
such a discontinuity. The set of equilibria can contract from the set of in-
dividually rational, feasible strategies to the set of one shot Nash equilibria.
In the model with a continuum of commuters, when an individual commuter
changes their strategy, there will be no change in what is observed by other
agents, say their commuting time, so there is no basis on which to punish
deviators. Thus, the anti-folk theorem applies. But now consider the model
with a finite number of commuters. Even if the number of commuters is
large, deviations from a prescribed along-the-equilibrium-path-strategy can be
detected (for instance by commuters on the same route using the same depar-
ture time on the equilibrium path since their commuting time changes) and
therefore can be punished. This explains the contraction of the equilibrium
set. However, one can easily argue that as the number of agents gets large,
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these deviations become undetectable, as their eﬀects are small and indistin-
guishable from noise. For example, an analog would be to assume perfect
competition in the context of a finite number of agents, where the error from
this assumption is small for large economies.
If this were true, then there would be no substantial error in simply using
the limit commuting game with a continuum of commuters. The big problem
here is that the eﬀects of deviations in large but finite commuting games are not
small. To see this, consider the simple example from the introduction with 2
nodes and 1 link. Instead of using a continuum of commuters, consider a large
but finite number. Consider either the uncongested or congested commuting
pattern. Pure commuter strategies are uniformly distributed over departure
times that get the commuters to work by the given arrival time (given that
the number of commuters is divisible by the number of such departure times).
Suppose that a commuter changes their strategy from the second departure
time to the first. This will slow down the first cohort. The second cohort
will quickly catch up, slowing down both cohorts. The third cohort will
catch up to the first two, and so forth. This “snowball eﬀect” will not only
be detectable (even if individual strategies aren’t), but it also substantially
changes the behavior of the entire system due to one commuter’s deviation.
Such a “snowball eﬀect” is simply not possible in the commuting game with a
continuum of commuters.
In other words, the behavior of the game with a continuum of commuters
where individual commuter strategies are undetectable diﬀers from the be-
havior of the commuting game with a large but finite number of commuters
where individual strategies are unobserved. For this reason, we view the re-
peated commuting game with a continuum of commuters where the individual
strategies are undetectable, and the associated anti-folk theorem, as irrelevant.
In the general game theory literature with a continuum of players, only
the extreme cases of observability (the folk theorem) and unobservability (the
anti-folk theorem) have been investigated thoroughly. There are two more
important points to be made about the application to the commuting game.
First, the commuters who observe a defection are not necessarily those who
punish. In the simple one route example, of course any commuter who observes
a defection can punish. However, with many routes, this might not be possible.
If individual strategies are observable to all, for example neighbors departing
at the same time and along the same route, then of course we are back in the
context of the folk theorem. An alternative assumption is that any defection
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causes a snowball eﬀect, in that a positive measure of commuters is aﬀected.
Then it is assumed that if a positive measure of commuters is aﬀected, this is
observable to all and the deviators can be punished.
The problem with this idea is that there is literally no snowball eﬀect with
a continuum of commuters, but only with a large but finite (or countable)
number. In fact, this is the reason there is a discontinuity of the Nash equilib-
rium correspondence in the limit as the number of commuters goes to infinity.
A suﬃcient condition for a snowball eﬀect in large but finite games close to
the game with a continuum of commuters of interest is: For the given one
shot strategy profile that is to be supported as a repeated game Nash equi-
librium, at any time on any link with a positive local density of commuters,
local density is above the capacity of the link. Under this condition on the
strategy profile, whenever a commuter deviates, there is a snowball eﬀect; this
is detected and punished by everyone.
In summary, our conclusion is that although the snowball eﬀect is not
present in commuting games with a continuum of commuters, it is present in
the large but finite games nearby. We also assume that eﬀects on any positive
measure of commuters are observable to all. Thus, under a suﬃcient condition
on strategies to be supported in the repeated game, it makes sense to say
that the consequence of any individual deviation from a prescribed strategy is
observable, and thus the folk theorem is applicable to such strategies in the
repeated game with a continuum of commuters.
Therefore, be it from observations of neighboring commuters or the snow-
ball eﬀect, the folk theorem in the model with a continuum of commuters seems
relevant.
A messy alternative to our framework would employ a finite or countable
number of commuters and either Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies or -
equilibrium in pure strategies. The drawbacks of this approach are tractability
and consistency with the balance of the literature on commuting. However,
the advantages of this approach are that the snowball eﬀect and application
of the folk theorem could be made explicit.
3.3 Evidence
In this subsection, we examine evidence, in the context of the repeated com-
muting game, that can tell us whether commuters are playing a one shot Nash
equilibrium in all periods, or whether other strategies, possibly more eﬃcient,
are used. The idea for the analysis is similar to that used in Lee (1999), but
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now in the context of commuting.
Consider a repeated game with a termination date that is finite and known
to the players. In general, it is expected that only one shot Nash equilibrium
will be played every period, since backward induction leads to the unravelling
of other possible equilibrium strategies.
However, as described in Lee (1999, p. 123), there are various theories
involving small changes in the classical repeated game model that lead to a
kind of folk theorem in finitely repeated games. This is exploited by the
empirical work in the field.14 Next we proceed to try to determine which
equilibrium strategy is reflected in commuting data.
If for example the players are myopic and playing one shot Nash, then it
is expected that behavior will not change as the termination date approaches.
If the players are using strategies other than one shot Nash, for example they
are participating in some tacit collusion as the folk theorem might predict,
then one expects to see such strategies played when the termination date of
the game is not near, but reversion to one shot Nash equilibrium close to the
termination date.
How does this work in the context of the repeated commuting game? On
January 2, 2008, reconstruction was begun on I-64 (state route 40), a major
east-west commuting corridor in St. Louis. A portion was completely shut
down. Parts were reopened a year later, though other (adjacent) parts were
shut down at that time.15 We take this to be the termination of a repeated,
daily commuting game. This closure was announced years in advance, so
it was not a shock to commuters. We examine rush hour traﬃc speed and
volume for locations that were closed on this date.
If commuters were playing one shot Nash strategies, one would expect to
see the same rush hour traﬃc speed daily until close to the closure. Near
the time of the closure, traﬃc would drop oﬀ and speed would increase as
commuters explored alternate routes to be used after closure.
If commuters were playing a strategy other than one shot Nash, for example
Pareto dominant over one shot Nash, then one would expect to see high traﬃc
speed when the closure is not imminent, followed by lower traﬃc speed as the
closure date approaches and one shot Nash is played,16 followed by an increase
14If the folk theorem only applied to infinitely repeated games, those wishing to determine
which strategies are played in equilibrium would be waiting a long time for data.
15The entire highway was reopened on December 7, 2009.
16The exact timing depends on both the model used for the folk theorem in the finitely
repeated game and the discount factor.
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in speed near the closure date due to commuters exploring alternate routes.
Thus, it is detection of this counterintuitive decrease in traﬃc speed as the
closure date approaches that can distinguish among the equilibria of the system.
Before presenting the data, it is useful to recall the fundamental identity
of traﬃc, namely: Traﬃc volume is equal to speed times density. We have
obtained data on volume and speed, so density can be calculated. But there
are two important points to be made. First, volume is not terribly informative
on its own in general, as there can be two equilibria with the same volume, one
with low speed and high density, the other with low density and high speed.
Second, the externality actually perceived by commuters is in speed, so we
focus on that.
We have obtained data from two sensor locations, one toward the east end
(closer to the downtown area) of the closure, the other at the west end.17 Let’s
examine the east location first, studying evening then morning rush hour. The
figures graph average traﬃc speed and total volume in the hour by date. We
have deleted weekends, but we have not deleted holidays that fall on weekdays.
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Figure 1 (again): Evening rush hour (5-6 PM) I-64 westbound weekdays .3
miles west of Hampton Avenue
17The author was oﬀered more data than the one calendar year at two sensors actually
provided, but at the cost of relinquishing rights to all future work (whether related to this
project or not), as well as other considerations.
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Figure 2: Evening rush hour (5-6 PM) I-64 westbound weekdays .3 miles
west of Hampton Avenue
Notice that in early October, there is a decrease in speed and an attendant
increase in volume, as seen in Figures 1 and 2. The outliers in the data are
obviously accidents. For morning rush hour, as seen in Figure 3, there is a
similar eﬀect, though not as large in magnitude and with speed increasing over
the Thanksgiving holiday.
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Figure 3: Morning rush hour (8-9 AM) I-64 eastbound weekdays .3 miles
west of Hampton Avenue
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Evening rush hour for the west sensor is displayed in Figure 4. In general,
for the west sensor (more distant from the central business district), traﬃc
moves at the speed limit. We conjecture that this is due to the fact that
traﬃc in this area is not congested enough to cause speeds to drop below the
speed limit during rush hours.
Many questions arise at this point. Does weather cause traﬃc to slow down
in the fall? There are two responses. In the author’s experience, most of the
inclement driving weather occurs in St. Louis during the time period frommid-
December to mid-February. Moreover, the sensors at the west end of the shut
down, that show no decrease in speed, serve as a nice control for weather, as St.
Louis is very flat and thus weather seems to be common to most of the area.
Can Christmas shopping can account for the increased traﬃc? Most stores
used for shopping are now located in malls well outside the city, along with
most of the area’s population. Does an increasing accident rate in the fall cause
the decrease in speed rather than the theory we have put forth? If this were
the case, we would observe a decrease in volume accompanying the decrease
in speed. Instead, we observe an increase in volume in the data. Could
the eﬀect we observe be due to intertemporal substitution between commuting
with a car and commuting with mass transit, where commuters take advantage
of the expressway when it is open? Conceptually, this would depend on the
elasticity of substitution between commuting mode choices. This elasticity of
substitution has been found to be quite low; see, for example, Chung (1979).
Is the change in commuting speed seasonal? In theory, one could look at
commuting in 2006. However, a low probability event occurred that year that
disrupted commuting and corrupted data throughout the fall - the Cardinals
(unexpectedly) won the World Series.
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Figure 4: Evening rush hour (5-6 PM) I-64 westbound weekdays .7 miles
west of Brentwood Boulevard
In summary, there is some evidence that commuters are not playing one
shot Nash equilibrium. They revert to one shot Nash strategies at around 2
1/2 to 3 months from the end of the game.
4 Conclusions
We have asked and answered several questions about commuting using two
models, one static and one dynamic. For each model, we have shown that a
Nash equilibrium in pure strategies exists for the one shot game, that a Pareto
optimum exists, and that Nash equilibrium is generally not Pareto optimal.
Beyond that, we have shown that all Nash equilibria of the static model can
look very diﬀerent from any Nash equilibrium of the dynamic model. Since
the static model features behavior unlike the dynamic one, we reject the former
as a reduced form of the latter and stick with the dynamic model. Finally,
we examine the set of Nash equilibria in the infinitely repeated versions of
both the static and dynamic commuting games, and use the folk theorem to
obtain these large sets. Why have the additional equilibria from the repeated
game, including eﬃcient equilibria, been ignored by the literature? It would
be interesting to see if classical assertions of transportation economists that
“commuting equilibria are ineﬃcient due to a congestion externality” hold
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in the real world. We have presented some preliminary evidence from the
shutdown of an expressway in St. Louis that commuters do not always play
one shot Nash equilibrium. We have also discussed the application of the anti-
folk theorem to our specific game, namely conditions under which the Nash
equilibria of the infinitely repeated game are the Nash equilibria of the one
shot game.
The commuting folk theorem poses a direct challenge to congestion pric-
ing. If commuters are already playing equilibrium strategies that are eﬃcient
without tolls, congestion pricing can mess this up.
The folk theorem and anti-folk theorem can also be applied to repeated
versions of other one shot models in the literature, such as Arnott et al. (1993).
It would be very interesting to explore experimental complements to our theory
and data; for example, see Daniel et el (2009). Which equilibrium of the
repeated game is selected in the laboratory?
Future work includes examining the repeated dynamic model with myopic
commuters. The set of Nash equilibria will include the equilibria from the
one shot game, but not as many as in the repeated commuting game with a
discount factor close to 1.
The repeated dynamic model should be applied to real world commut-
ing. Since it can accommodate an arbitrary (exogenous) route structure, it
has both positive and normative content, especially regarding Pareto improve-
ments. For example, it can be used to perform cost benefit analysis with
respect to changing infrastructure and mass transit.
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